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Recognizing Nonhuman Morality
ABSTRACT
Claims that some sorts of genuine moral behavior exist in nonhuman 
beings are increasingly common. Many people, however, remain un-
convinced, despite growing acceptance of the remarkable behavioral 
complexity of animals and despite the admission that there may be 
significant differences between human and nonhuman moral behav-
ior. This paper argues that the rejection of “moral animals” is mis-
placed. Yet at the same time, it attempts to show how the philosophi-
cal task of exhibiting the possibility of nonhuman moral behavior is 
often misguided, leaving claims about nonhuman morality unneces-
sarily exposed to philosophical rejection.  
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I Introduction
The question of nonhuman morality is increasingly on the 
scientific and philosophical agenda. There are two general 
philosophical positions on the possibility of genuine nonhu-
man moral behavior that are considered in this essay. The first 
position, though not necessarily skeptical about the behavioral 
complexity of animals, nevertheless rejects this possibility or 
reduces it to a metaphorical or analogical one. This rejection or 
reduction is the result of conceptual criticism. 
The second position embraces the possibility of nonhuman 
morality, typically offering certain empirical and conceptual 
grounds that are intended to underwrite it. The approach in this 
paper is to identify, and suggest the removal of, philosophi-
cal assumptions, shared by both these positions, which either 
(a) encourage for insufficient reasons the rejection of nonhu-
man moral behavior, or (b) allow too readily the repudiation of 
that possibility on the grounds of conceptual naiveté or confu-
sion. The paper is about nonhuman animals. But the possibility 
might also be noted of applying its conclusions to very young 
children and the severely retarded.           
II The Conceptual Terrain – Moby Dick 
In a speech from Herman Melville’s famous novel (1961), 
Captain Ahab apparently implies that the whale is capable of 
moral behavior, when he cries,
“it was Moby Dick that dismasted me; Moby Dick that 
brought me to this dead stump I stand on now. Aye, 
aye,” he shouted with a terrific, loud, animal sob, like 
that of a heart-stricken moose; “Aye, Aye! It was that 
accursed white whale that razed me; made a poor peg-
ging lubber of me forever and a day!” (166).
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Notwithstanding obvious metaphorical uses of the whale, 
Ishmael’s telling of the tale challenges us to consider whether 
Ahab might be, on this point, partly sane. But contrast Ahab 
with his chief mate Starbuck:
“Vengeance on a dumb brute!” cried Starbuck, “that 
simply smote thee from blindest instinct! Madness! To 
be enraged with a dumb thing, Captain Ahab, seems 
blasphemous” (167).
Perhaps the novel affirms this thought. But look more closely 
at how Ishmael draws certain relations between man and beast. 
Third mate Flask harbors animosity toward all sperm whales, 
resembling the animosity some people have regarding cats, but 
in Flask’s “poor opinion, the wondrous whale was but a species 
of magnified mouse” (125).
Flask’s attitude clashes with Ahab’s equally violent one, as 
when Ahab declaims: 
“I will not say as schoolboys do to bullies, Take some 
one of your own size; don’t pommel me! No, ye’ve 
knocked me down, and I am up again, but ye have run 
and hidden. Come forth from behind your cotton bags! 
I have no long gun to reach ye. Come, Ahab’s compli-
ments to ye; come and see if ye can swerve me” (171).
In contrast to Flask and Starbuck, Ahab credits the whale with 
highly complex behavior. For although it may be hard to believe 
that “such bulky masses of overgrowth can possibly [have] the 
same sort of life that lives in a dog or horse” (269), Ishmael’s 
whale has at least the same sort of feeling and intelligence - in-
telligent feeling perhaps—as some familiar land animals. 
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Far from being a dumb brute, Moby Dick has an “intelligent 
malignity which, according to specific accounts, he had over 
and over again evinced in his assaults” (184). When he has the 
men at his mercy, the whaling rowboat between his jaws, he 
shakes “the slight cedar as a mildly cruel cat her mouse” (513). 
It is his unreasoning yet intelligent feeling that makes a power-
ful impression, first on Ahab, and then, via Ahab’s passionate 
example, on the rest of the crew:
“Commend the murderous chalices! Bestow them, ye 
who are now made parties to this indissoluble league…
Drink ye harpooners! Drink and swear, ye men that 
man the deathful whaleboat’s bow —Death to Moby 
Dick! God hunt us all, if we do not hunt Moby dick to 
his death!    
The long, barbed steel goblets were lifted; and to cries 
and maledictions against the white whale, the spirits 
were simultaneously quaffed down with a hiss” (170).
In mapping the conceptual terrain around our question, two op-
posing views of animals may be flagged. The first is that of 
Starbuck, the coolly dispassionate observer of a “dumb brute” 
quite incapable of moral action, but also that of those modern 
readers who, though in these modern times increasingly dis-
posed to recognize complex, intelligent animal behavior, con-
tinue to deny that they can be moral. 
The second view is of those who, like the passionate cap-
tain and crew of the Pequod, are engaged in various ways by 
nonhuman animals and regard them as beings capable of moral 
behavior. A central question to examine is whether claimants of 
bona fide nonhuman moral behavior must be naïve about moral 
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concepts applied to nonhumans or whether, contrariwise, their 
critics are the ones guilty of conceptual inadequacy. 
III Rejection of Nonhuman Morality 
Doubt exists even amongst animals’ strong defenders. Tom 
Regan says that animals, children, and the mentally retarded 
not only are not “moral agents”, they are merely “moral pa-
tients” (1985, 152). Alasdair MacIntyre says that while animals 
have a kind of practical rationality, only humans can develop 
the independent practical reason (1999, 83) that is a precondi-
tion of moral virtue. Animals, he claims, cannot reflect upon 
their histories and futures, their births and deaths, nor enter into 
discussions about these pivotal events. 
Rosalind Hursthouse agrees that the absence of rational de-
cision-making and choice means that animals, unlike humans, 
are biologically determined (1999, 220). For her, “concepts 
of ‘a good member of the species x’, and ‘living well as x’…
are completely constrained by what members and specialized 
members of the species in question actually do” (221). So “an 
exceptional [male] polar bear that hangs around its cubs of-
fering food” rather than abandoning them is defective (220); 
but the nurturing wolf lives well and is good. Naturalism’s 
language here of excellence and defect is biologically evalua-
tive only. For Hursthouse, it eliminates moral descriptions of, 
for instance, the impressively caring male who bucks the polar 
bear norm.
According to these arguments, animals lack emotional and 
cognitive capacities necessary for moral behavior. My point 
will not be that there is no significant difference between hu-
man and animal behavior, but rather that significant dissimilar-
ity does not imply that nonhuman morality is impossible.
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IV Some Conceptual Obstacles
Sometimes it feels natural to describe animals in moral terms. 
Often, however, it is tempting to reject all such descriptions. 
Why? Recognition of morality in human beings is recognition 
of behavior that is tied to great cognitive and psychological so-
phistication. Furthermore, human morality, in all its complexity 
and depth, uniquely affects our imaginations and our lives. The 
behavior of animals can strike us as being nowhere close to 
genuine moral behavior. It is not merely that individual humans 
can be exceptional in their depravity and their goodness, but 
that we can in principle have exchanges and conversations with 
others on the meaning of all things morally serious. 
Rejection of the conceptual possibility of nonhuman moral 
behavior is given further impetus by the way our concepts can 
become distorted and confused, both in philosophical, and in 
ordinary, discourse. In the following conceptual examination, 
attention will be paid to the uses of concepts in both areas of 
discourse, so that we might eventually determine whether talk 
of good and bad dogs, of rogue and trustworthy horses, is just 
naturalistic and metaphorical, or rather literally moral, and in 
what way. 
Philosopher Alison Hills exhibits the naturalness of the 
skeptical attitude when she writes: 
Of course, we can say that certain animals are acting 
like someone who is generous or benevolent, but we 
should not praise them for acting well unless we are 
also prepared to hold responsible animals that seem 
selfish and violent (2005, 77). 
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Hills thinks it obvious that animals can never be praised or 
blamed, and that it follows, equally obviously, that they are not 
moral beings. The obviousness of the assumption about a nec-
essary conceptual connection between responsibility/holding 
to account and morality is worth dwelling on. I shall do so by 
means of stories about two Marys – one a child, the other an 
elephant.
Philosopher Raimond Gaita’s (2004b) discussion of Mary 
Bell, the eleven year old British child-killer, concerns con-
ceptual confusion in relation to human moral behavior. Gaita 
points out that, on the one hand, we may be appalled by the 
evil of Mary’s assault on innocence, but that, on the other hand, 
we can find it hard to accept that the actions of a killer, who is 
also a child and is therefore similarly innocent, could be evil. 
Furthermore,
we hardly know how to attribute to child-killers con-
cepts that they must possess if they are to have the 
intentions necessary for their actions to be evil. Mary 
Bell persistently pleaded that she did not understand 
that death is final (45).  
I shall return to this, but will here note Gaita’s suggestion that 
those who would call Mary’s actions wrong or evil can never-
theless
 withhold a certain kind of judgment, the kind we now 
call judgmentalism – judgment that would blame her 
(bearing in mind all the connotations of that word), that 
would encourage one to point a finger at her and to turn 
one’s back on her. This strikes some people as incoher-
ent: how can one both see (and in that sense judge) a 
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situation in a severe moral light while at the same time 
refusing to blame its agent? (220). 
The warning about moralism speaks to the familiar human ten-
dency to judge harshly and to hold responsible or to account, 
a temptation which, as Cora Diamond remarks, is as effec-
tive in non-theoretical contexts as it is in philosophical ones 
at “lead[ing] us away from any recognition of genuine variety 
within moral experience” (1997, 228). Thus, we may be held 
“hostage to a false sense of what the possibilities are” (Gaita 
2004b, 47) both inside philosophy and in ordinary life. And 
so the possibility is overlooked that we can be shocked, morti-
fied, and even angered, by Mary’s actions and character whilst 
refusing to blame her. In a Socratic spirit, we may even feel 
pity for her because she had become evil. These possibilities 
break the conceptual link which is mistakenly held to connect, 
by necessity, wrongdoing with blame.
American writer Charles Siebert (2009) tells the story of our 
second Mary, an elephant in a 1916 US traveling circus. Mary 
was said to have smashed the head of a young hotel janitor. The 
public’s bloodlust to kill “Murderous Mary” was appeased by 
Charlie Sparks, the circus owner. After entertaining the option 
of having Mary electrocuted by Thomas Edison, who was test-
ing Westinghouse’s alternating current on animals “in hopes of 
discrediting it as being too dangerous, Sparks ultimately decid-
ed to have Mary hanged” (87-88), which he did from a crane—
twice, since the first attempt failed—in front of an audience. 
The brutally comic absurdity of treating Mary’s actions as if 
they were on the very same plane as wicked, fully responsible 
human ones (something Ahab is perhaps prone to do) might 
encourage us to regard as altogether unintelligible a moral re-
sponse to animal behavior.
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Defenders of animal morality, including those I will shortly 
criticize, are not compelled to conclude that animals can be se-
rial killers or rapists, saints or moral heroes, just as they are not 
compelled by an imaginary logic of moral consistency to say 
that “Murderous Mary”, though she may have acted morally 
badly, can be a murderer—even if Mary Bell can be that. By the 
same token, there is no conceptual moral guidebook prescrib-
ing that certain forms of “holding responsible”—such as grati-
tude and anger—must be withheld, on pain of confusion, from 
nonhuman animals in all instances. Perhaps such responses are 
intelligible even as we deny, because it misleadingly suggests 
that animals can morally reflect and deliberate, that they can be 
moral “agents.”    
And yet it is true that our nonhuman Mary, unlike the human 
Mary, was not a child developing towards full moral maturity. 
For the maturing Mary Bell, it was an intelligible possibility 
that, as she began to reflect upon her past, the moral mean-
ing of her actions and character could become known to her. 
In contrast, two conceptual deficiencies are seemingly present 
in Elephant Mary. The first is psychological/cognitive: fully 
knowing, for instance, that “dead is dead.” But as we saw, that 
conceptual deficiency did not have to stop us from recognizing 
Mary Bell’s behavior as morally appalling. The second defi-
ciency is moral: “I simply  must not hurt him;” “This is so ter-
ribly wrong;” “I am a bad and wicked girl;” “I deserve to go to 
hell”—these are thoughts containing moral concepts, concepts 
which we can easily imagine Mary Bell, but arguably not Mary 
the elephant, uttering, thinking, being prompted to articulate, 
and expanding upon. 
It can further be observed in Mary Bell’s case, assuming a 
preparedness to grant that an eleven year old child is a bona 
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fide moral being, that the possibility of some sort of moral be-
havior is not dependent upon a highly abstract understanding of 
moral possibilities, let alone of philosophical, theoretical ones. 
But having done away with an overly intellectualized concep-
tion which rules over the whole range of possible moral action, 
there remains the problem of nonhuman animals lacking moral 
concepts, at all stages of their lives. I shall later suggest that 
this “problem” is soluble in the animals’ favor. But I shall first 
suggest that the size of the “problem” needs to be felt, before 
it is addressed.  
V Problems with Standard Approaches
In this section, I will consider some representative modern 
attempts, which are often influenced by Charles Darwin and 
by new empirical evidence, to argue for the radical conclusion 
that animals are capable of moral behavior. These attempts are 
highly vulnerable to rejection by critics.
Philosopher Stephen Clark (1985) argues that animals are 
not always “moved solely by immediate desire and pain” (45), 
but can indeed act with intelligent social awareness (46). Jane 
Goodall once observed a group of chimpanzees who “ignored 
or bullied a companion who was partly paralyzed” (50). But 
one particular 
[C]himpanzee, though disliking the smell (and one can 
reasonably assume) as much “turned off” by physi-
cal weakness and abnormality as his companions (and 
most humans), did none the less continue to treat the 
unfortunate and lonely ape as his old friend and com-
panion. The impulse to friendship was stronger in him 
than the impulse to despise…He preferred one way of 
acting to another that he might have preferred (50).
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In addition, Clark claims that certain dispositions, like the dis-
position to friendship which we normally think of as moral, 
are surprisingly widespread in the animal kingdom. It is only 
prejudice, much like the bigotry which once closed our eyes to 
the rich moral lives of “barbarians” and “savages” (42), that 
blinds us to the richness of animal behavior. Clark concludes 
that because it lacks the input of reason, animal virtues are not 
“moral virtues,” but are, nevertheless, commendable “natural 
virtues” (46).
Philosopher James Rachels, emphasizing more than Clark 
the importance of scientific rigor (1991, 170), discusses a fa-
mous 1964 experiment which concluded that most rhesus mon-
key strongly prefer to suffer hunger than to “secure food at the 
expense of electroshock to a conspecific” (150). Combining 
controlled experiments, Darwinian continuity, and the concep-
tual claim that altruism might be defined as “the willingness 
to forgo some good for oneself in order to help others” (149), 
Rachels concludes that Darwin was right in his “view of ani-
mals as (at least partially) moral beings” (152). 
The conceptual component of this strategy is that animal and 
human behavior, such as altruistic action, is sometimes so simi-
lar that it becomes compellingly clear that certain animals have 
modest moral powers. However, this tactic is seriously open to 
skeptical misgivings. Here is an example of its vulnerability. 
Rachels claims there is sometimes a close correspondence be-
tween unthinking human moral behavior and the non-reflective 
behavior of animals. If the former is moral behavior, then so is 
the latter, even though we know that mature humans are capa-
ble of additional, more sophisticated forms of moral behavior, 
such as acting from a sense of duty, meaning, or moral rule. 
Rachels thinks that unreflective compassion is paradigmatic 
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moral behavior - the behavior of a person who willingly assists 
others without pausing to consider whether she has sufficient 
reason for it. 
Spontaneous compassion is a plausible candidate for para-
digmatic moral behavior. But Rachels does not question wheth-
er there is a telling conceptual difference between unreflective 
human and animal behavior. He knows, as virtually all mature 
adults know, that morally good but unreflective adult human 
beings are nevertheless potentially conversant with an exten-
sive range of moral concepts.  But Rachels does not ask wheth-
er this fact makes a fundamental difference to how we identify 
the nature of morality, and thus whether sheer compassion does 
the exemplary and persuasive work he asks of it in making his 
appeal to our powers of conceptual discernment. 
In other words, the supposedly paradigmatic moral action 
to which Rachels draws our attention may indeed be an unrea-
soned response to another’s need, while at the same time nec-
essarily being a response which is undertaken by a being that 
is intelligibly morally equipped in these other ways. Indeed, 
the very fact that it is an unreasoned response may have its 
persuasive force and edifying potential precisely in the context 
of a being who might exercise moral thought in a full-blooded 
way. For it is only here that we can say things like (maybe in 
the context of teaching a child about goodness), “See how she 
helps those rough beggars without a second thought.”  
In the same vein, the critic may argue that for any example of 
remarkable behavioral similarity there are crucial divergences. 
Specifically, the difference is likely to be around the possession 
of moral concepts, even if they are only the limited ones that, 
say, an eleven year child may have. Thus, the critic will main-
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tain that Rachels-like arguments are naïve or misguided, since 
merely presenting uncanny behavioral similarities overlooks an 
essential criterion of moral behavior; and that the only escape 
from this impasse is to claim either that (a) animals have hu-
man-like moral concepts (or equivalent non-conceptual moral 
thought), or that (b) moral concepts/thought are not necessary 
for human-like moral behavior. Later I shall suggest that it is 
not necessary to regard either option as plausible to identify a 
conceptual place for moral behavior in animals. Nor, impor-
tantly, is it necessary to deny that the behavioral features—the 
cognitive, social, and psychological features—of animals con-
ceptually underdetermine the moral nature of their behavior.         
However, perhaps more recent work in ethology will help 
show that emerging evidence of remarkable cognitive and 
psychological complexity of animals is, after all, sufficient. 
Take an example put together from Marc Beckoff and Jes-
sica Pierce’s book Wild Justice: The Moral Lives of Animals 
(2009) which draws on recent scientific work, including that of 
Beckoff himself and of primate scientist Frans de Waal. Some 
animals like chimps and capuchins, scientists claim, have the 
startling social ability to track the behavior and character of 
members of their group—who has received what rewards, who 
has contributed to the group, who is reliably helpful and un-
helpful, who has given me food, etc. Apart from these impres-
sive cognitive feats of memory and intelligence, these primates 
also possess the capacity for a range of psychological attitudes 
and responses, including angrily punishing or shunning “free-
loaders” and under-contributors, pointedly refusing rewards 
when others observably get better ones, reciprocating helpful 
deeds, and being kinder toward more cooperative individuals. 
This behavior, Beckoff and Pierce argue, looks suspiciously 
like moral behavior, even more so perhaps than the impressive 
Simon Coghlan
98
© Between the Species, 2014
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/
Vol. 17, Issue 1
examples of compassion and altruism. In fact, the authors argue 
that this complex social behavior amounts to a moral sense of 
justice or fairness.     
Some remarks by philosopher Mark Rowlands can be used 
to buttress this case. Rowlands makes the proposal that a be-
ing qualifies as a moral subject if she, being sufficiently emo-
tionally complex, is reliably sensitive to features designated as 
good or bad-making features by some correct normative theory 
(2013, 22), without necessarily being known as such. Now, if 
the socially sophisticated chimp or capuchin discerns and re-
sponds as Beckoff and Pierce describe, while being reliably 
normatively orientated, there seems to be a strong case for say-
ing she has a moral sense of justice or fairness.
Unfortunately, if we adhere only to the grounds adduced, 
the case is not convincing. For although the discerning capu-
chin has undeniably a sense of who in the group has gotten 
what (and so on), plus remarkable affective responses to these 
circumstances, it is difficult to see that these capacities alone 
(notwithstanding Rowlands’ supplementary suggestion) allow 
discrimination between a non-moral sense of “justice” and a 
genuinely moral sense of justice, however simple. In fact, the 
scientific term “inequity aversion”—or, better, “disproportion 
aversion” (and other morally neutral terms of this type) - may 
be thought to better capture the nature of such behavior. As 
long as we are looking only from the perspective of behavioral 
similarity with the human paradigm, ever-increasing behavior-
al sophistication in the absence of moral concepts or thought 
will achieve nothing, and the apparently simpler case of the 
compassionate animal will serve just as well, or as badly, as the 
case of the “inequity averse” one.  In order to recognize moral 
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behavior in the lives of animals who have intelligent feeling, a 
major change in perspective is required.
VI A More Fruitful Approach?
When Stephen Clark says animals can be “ethical: that is, 
they respond to aspects of a situation and to features of their 
kindred, that a good man would also respect” (1982, 107), 
he suggests, like Rowlands, that we need to take a normative 
stance on nonhuman morality. But, I shall propose, the type of 
normative stance required must go much further. To develop 
this theme, recall Beckoff and Pierce’s (2009) inadequate claim 
that a certain level of social sophistication is both necessary 
and sufficient for moral intelligence. For them, morality is a 
species-specific concept concerning that which is both benefi-
cial/harmful to, and rule-enforced by, the group to which an 
individual belongs. Partly in order to avoid the accusation of 
relativism, Beckoff and Pierce assert that their identification of 
moral behavior is descriptive and not normative.
But this approach will not work for nonhuman animals. 
Why? It may be true that we can rightly identify human be-
havior across vastly different cultural settings—which reveal, 
for example, quite dissimilar moral conceptions of compassion 
etc.—as moral behavior. But that is at least partly because, 
even when their moral norms simply baffle us, we can recog-
nize these others as in possession of at least some intelligible 
moral concepts and thought. Yet if nonhuman animals are not 
so equipped, it does appear impossible to identify moral be-
havior in them without taking a normative stance (beyond the 
one suggested by Clark and Rowlands) on what counts as, say, 
a (morally) good dog action or chimpanzee character. Barring 
this, the sort of skeptic who requires that “moral animals” have 
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the kind of moral concepts and thought that (for example) an 
eleven year old human child has, will never be convinced.   
Offering this kind of doubter increasingly sophisticated, 
comparative descriptions of animal behavior is therefore use-
less. If she is ever to be convinced, a new approach is need-
ed—not because it is certain thereby to change her mind, but 
because there is no other way to change her mind. Beckoff and 
Pierce’s stated stance, disengaged and purely descriptive, must 
be replaced with another stance, in which one can only legiti-
mately recognize nonhuman moral behavior if, in certain ways, 
one is engaged by it in its particularity. And this claim can be 
accompanied with a reminder that moral behavior in human 
life and animal life may present very differently. It all depends 
upon the details of the stance taken. Indeed, many consider-
ations may come into play, including our own understanding 
of the right and the good in human life, and the psychological 
and cognitive abilities of nonhuman individuals and of their 
groups and species. Again, we should not rush to place unwar-
ranted limits on the possibilities. For instance: pace Hursthouse 
and Beckoff/Pierce, there is no conceptual necessity to refuse 
to recognize as morally good the caring male polar bear on ac-
count of the notion of a “species norm.” In fact, the species 
norm in this example may add to the moral impressiveness of 
this particular polar bear. 
The need for overt moral commitment and appraisal, and the 
right method of making that move, are both bound to be highly 
controversial issues. Nonetheless, I will present, albeit briefly, 
one candidate approach. Because this approach does not rely 
merely on (albeit sophisticated) comparisons of humans and 
animals, or on clearly inadequate characterizations of human 
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morality, it has greater potential to avoid the skeptical problems 
mentioned (though not, of course, all skepticism).  
 Consider first some words of David Hume:  
[A]n action, sentiment, or character is virtuous or vi-
cious; why? because its view causes a pleasure or un-
easiness…To have the sense of a virtue, is nothing but 
to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the con-
templation of a character. The very feeling constitutes 
our praise or admiration (2009, 471). 
Hume asks why “incest in the human species is criminal, and 
why the very same action, and the same relations in animals 
have not the smallest moral turpitude and deformity?” (467), 
and answers that we do not feel that animal incest is immoral, 
just as we do not feel that the sapling commits parricide. (Hume 
is of course more complex on this issue, but that is not now 
relevant.) 
The reduction of moral assessment to feeling and sentiment, 
however, does not follow from the recognition of a conceptual 
dependence on modes of responsive normative judgment. Take, 
for example, philosopher Peter Winch’s argument, in interpret-
ing the second part of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investiga-
tions (2009), that certain non-moral concepts are characterized 
by a conceptual interdependency of object (individuals and 
their behavior) and response (1987, 140). Winch claimed that 
possession of a concept like pain and the recognition of its in-
stances depends conceptually on the possibility of our having 
certain responses, like that of pity, towards the sufferer of pain.
Arguably, many moral concepts and our understanding of 
them have a related construction and relation to the understand-
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ing. These “response-dependent” concepts may, in the present 
context, be better called “response-and-behavior-dependent” 
concepts, so as to stress the relevant conceptual interdepen-
dence. Recognition of the moral nature of animal behavior, on 
this view, occurs through aspects of their behavior as well as 
the details of their social relations and its circumstances. Ap-
plying moral concepts to animals means applying concepts 
which are constructed from, and recognized through, certain 
possible responses to certain forms of behavior. This view of 
moral concepts and understanding, of responses and their tar-
get, is significantly different from the view of the connection 
between human responses and moral understanding that may 
be read into the selected remarks of Hume. 
Moby Dick’s “unreasoned malice,” dependent as it is upon 
his life of intelligent feeling and visibly written “in his whole 
aspect” (Melville 1961, 534), affects Ahab and his crew to the 
point where the murderous chalices are raised and quaffed. The 
novel invites us to adopt a different perspective, to see an ani-
mal’s behavior as morally inflected rather than purely natural 
or analogical. In Ishmael’s eyes, the animal undergoes a trans-
formation. Should we experience this shift in perspective, I 
believe it will be work of the interdependence of nonhuman 
behavior and our complex responses to that behavior. We do 
not need to be persuaded by Moby Dick to mark this possibil-
ity. Of course, the thorough-going skeptic who, like Flask and 
Starbuck, remains disengaged from animals will remain uncon-
vinced. Still, her criticism can no longer be that recognizing 
nonhuman morality is the demonstrable result of an obvious 
kind of philosophical naïveté or confusion.     
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VII Moral Behavior in Animals
Not so long ago, ethologists were stunned by the sight of 
chimpanzees intelligently collaborating in the organized hunt-
ing of smaller apes. Viewers of the monkey killing footage may 
have been struck by the evident relish with which the hunters 
frenziedly tore their victims apart. Chimps have also been ob-
served determinedly hunting down other chimps in seemingly 
organized groups. Jane Goodall watched a lonely, half para-
lyzed chimp with polio seek in gentle desperation the compan-
ionship of two healthy chimpanzees, both of whom deliberately 
moved out of his reach and resumed their mutual grooming. 
Goodall expresses a moral response when she says that she 
then “came nearer to hating a chimpanzee than I have ever done 
before or since” (quoted in Midgley 1983, 121).
Simone Weil remarked that “Men have the same carnal na-
tures as animals. If a hen is hurt, the others rush up and peck 
it” (quoted in Gaita 2004a, 193). Weil’s words tell of a terrible 
animality belonging to human beings. Her words also reveal 
how different humans and animals are, in particular because 
of what it can mean for a human being to join in the “festival 
of cruelty.” Weil brings out something in the concept of human 
wickedness by recalling our responses to human behavior in 
the light of the carnal natures of animals. But we are now in a 
position to reverse the comparison and consider the behavior 
of animals in the light of the sheer callousness and cruelty of 
human beings. In doing so we may recognize a terrible (though 
different and certainly diminished) callousness and cruelty be-
longing also to animals. 
By calling this behavior terrible or shocking I am suggest-
ing that it may be registered through our responses as morally 
colored. This range of responses helps to structure and identify 
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forms of morally bad behavior or character. Additionally, we 
may recognize morally good types of behavior and character, 
and in a way that is connected with the bad. For example, a 
sense of moral disappointment, even of being failed by an ani-
mal’s behavior, may be the conceptual partner of the pleasure, 
wonder, and delight that may be taken in an animal’s action or 
character. 
This kind of moral response is glimpsed in the philosopher 
Rush Rhees’ diary about a Rottweiler called Danny (1999). Out 
of his interaction with Danny there gradually emerged a nu-
anced relationship of mutual understanding and feeling. This 
relationship may be viewed in a non-moral sense so far as the 
dog is concerned. Yet it becomes plain that Rhees believed he 
knew Danny in more than naturalistic terms, despite being the 
first to admit that animals cannot grasp moral meaning. In the 
diary, Rhees reflects on his fateful decision to allow Danny to 
undergo a veterinary procedure which proved fatal for the dog: 
Danny would never have allowed anyone to do to me 
what I allowed them to do to him [i.e. abandon him]. I 
speak from what I have seen him do (198).
I have felt put to shame by Danny…He never showed 
ingratitude, nor harbored resentment—(though God 
knows he had ground enough)—and this was not be-
cause he was placid and indifferent (199).     
VIII Conclusion
Rush Rhees’ own sense of animal moral behavior is depen-
dent on his immersion in a life with a dog or dogs—the kind of 
immersion that Beckoff and Pierce, despite their avowed nor-
mative detachment, believe led to their conclusions about ani-
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mal morality. For his part, Rhees was touched and even shamed 
by Danny’s behavior and character. 
Earlier we noted the distorting effects of moralism, which 
perhaps leads to the view that animals are not moral beings 
unless they can be intelligibly blamed or legally punished. 
Equally, there is absurdity in holding animals responsible as if 
they were human adults capable of evil and criminality. Some 
people find the idea that animal behavior can be described in 
moral terms absurd; others, as we saw, obviously do not. 
The examples I have adduced—from fine writers like Her-
man Melville and Rush Rhees, and from scientific stories and 
reports—suggests we do sometimes speak of the behavior and 
the character of certain animals in moral terms. We might speak 
of a whale as malicious, an elephant as cruelly violent, a chimp 
as callous, a dog as trustworthy—and our language can have 
moral meaning. That real moral claims about animal behavior 
are possible, I have argued, is shown through a careful consid-
eration of the conceptual nature of our descriptions of animal 
lives. Many attempts at demonstrating moral behavior in ani-
mals are insufficiently attentive to the full extent of our descrip-
tive/evaluative language concerning both morality and animals.
If someone—a philosopher or a non-philosopher—were to 
press against us the charge that surely we can’t really mean the 
things we say about animals—mean them, that is, in a bona 
fide moral sense—then we should reply that we literally do and 
can mean them in that sense. That can be insisted upon without 
implying that the animals involved have moral concepts or that 
they are to be praised or blamed in the way normal adult hu-
man beings often rightly (and wrongly) are. Some people reject 
the notion that very young children, the severely retarded, and 
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nonhuman animals can be moral. But on the contrary, there is 
no obvious or compelling reason to regard any of these three 
groups as incapable of moral behavior.  
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